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This study examines the cost and profit efficiency of banking sectors in six 
transition countries of South-Eastern Europe over the period 1998–2008. Using 
the stochastic frontier approach, our analysis reveals that the average cost 
efficiency of SEE banks is 68.59% and the average profit efficiency is 53.87%. 
The second-stage regressions on the determinants of bank efficiency further show 
that foreign banks are associated with higher profit efficiency but moderately 
lower cost efficiency. Government banks are associated with lower profit 
efficiency. The efficiency gap between foreign banks, domestic private banks and 
government banks, however, has narrowed over time. We also find that the degree 
of individual banks’ competitiveness has a positive association with both cost and 
profit efficiency. Finally, institutional development, proxied by progress in 
banking reforms, privatization and corporate governance restructuring, also has a 
positive impact on bank efficiency. 
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Mitä tuoreet tilastot Kaakkois-Euroopasta paljastavat 
siirtymätalouksien pankkien tehokkuudesta? 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 5/2011 
Yiwei Fang − Iftekhar Hasan − Katherin Marton 




Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan pankkitoiminnan kannattavuutta ja kustannus-
tehokkuutta kuudessa Kaakkois-Euroopan maassa vuosien 1998 ja 2008 välisenä 
aikana. Stokastisen rintamaestimointimenetelmän avulla lasketut arvioit viittaavat 
siihen, että Kaakkois-Euroopan pankkien kustannustehokkuus on keskimäärin 68,
59  % ja kannattavuus 53,87  %. Estimoidun pankkien tehokkuutta selittävän 
tilastollisen mallin mukaan ulkomaiset pankit ovat kotimaisia pankkeja kannatta-
vampia mutta lievästi kustannustehottomampia. Valtion omistamien pankkien 
kannattavuus ei puolestaan yllä vastaavanlaiseksi kuin muiden pankkien. Ulko-
maisten pankkien, kotimaisten yksityisten pankkien ja valtion pankkien väliset 
tehokkuuserot ovat kuitenkin ajan myötä kaventuneet. Tutkimustulosten mukaan 
yksittäisten pankkien hyvä kilpailukyky on lisäksi yhteydessä niiden hyvään kan-
nattavuuteen ja kustannustehokkuuteen. Institutionaalinen kehitys, jota tutkimuk-
sessa mitataan pankkitoiminnan uudistusten edistymisellä, yksityistämisellä ja 
yritystoiminnan hallinta- ja valvontajärjestelmien rakennejärjestelyillä, puolestaan 
parantaa pankkien kannattavuutta. 
 
Avainsanat: siirtymäajan pankkitoiminta, pankkien tehokkuus, ulkomainen omis-
tus, institutionaalinen kehitys 
 
JEL-luokittelu: G21, P30, P34, P52  
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During the 1990s, banking sectors in transition economies of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE hereafter) had gone through dramatic changes due to liberalization, 
privatization, and consolidation accompanied by large-scale participation of 
foreign banks. As the second decade of transition ended most countries 
transformed successfully from the former socialist monobank systems to market-
oriented, privately owned systems. This restructuring process received 
considerable interest both from academics and policy makers. Existing studies are 
focused predominantly on the banking sectors in transition countries of CEE. Less 
attention has so far been devoted, to the examination of South-Eastern European 
countries (SEE hereafter) where political events delayed implementation of major 
economic reforms. Despite the significant and rapid progress of the last decade, 
the relatively late start of the transition process, and lack of reliable and 
sufficiently long data have hampered such research. 
  Our study seeks to fill this gap by examining banking efficiency for six 
countries in the SEE region (including Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Serbia and Albania).
1 Using financial data from Bankscope, we calculate cost- 
and profit efficiency for 171 commercial banks over the 1998–2008 period. By 
reviewing the literature on bank efficiency we identify factors that could explain 
the efficiency differences among banks in countries of the SEE region.  We find 
important evidence in the literature that efficiency of banking sectors in CEE 
countries has significantly been influenced by ownership, market concentration 
and institutional variables. In our study we test whether and to what extent these 
main factors that were found to impact CEE banking efficiency are also applicable 
to SEE banks. 
  Our analysis on efficiency estimation reveals that with the average cost 
efficiency of 68.59% and the average profit efficiency of 53.87%, there is 
significant room for improvement though there are, however, substantial 
differences among the six countries in SEE. In exploring the factors that could 
explain variations in cost- and profit efficiency among banks, first we investigate 
the role of ownership. Controlling for various bank characteristics, the regression 
results show that ownership has a significantly impact on efficiency, though it 
influences cost and profit efficiencies differently.  Using domestic private banks 
as benchmark, foreign majority ownership is associated with significantly higher 
profit efficiency and marginally lower cost efficiency. Compared to domestic 
private banks government owned banks exhibit significantly lower profit 
efficiency but do not differ in cost efficiency. Our findings are consistent with 
former research findings foreign banks apply best-practice management and 
                                                 
1 We omitted Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro from our study since we could not obtain 
sufficient and long enough data.  
8 
compared to their domestic counterparts obtain higher return on their investment 
in developing countries (ie Claessens et al, 2001; Hasan and Marton, 2003; Berger 
et al, 2010). There is, however, also some evidence that their initial disadvantage 
in local knowledge in a new market may create a liability of foreignness, at least 
during the early years of their operations, and this makes them incur higher costs 
than domestic players (Green et al, 2004; Zajc, 2006; Lensink et al, 2008). Since 
our study covers a relatively long time period (1998–2008), we interact ownership 
with the time trend so that we can assess whether the effect of a specific 
ownership continues during the entire period. Interestingly, we find that over time 
foreign banks become more cost efficient but less profit efficient than domestic 
private banks. Over time, government-owned banks also start to catch up with 
domestic private banks and become more profitable in the later years of the 
transition. Secondly, we examine the role of individual banks’ competitiveness or 
market power on their efficiency. We measure competitiveness of a bank by the 
Lerner index, and find that banks with higher Lerner index are associated both 
with higher cost- and profit efficiency. This implies that higher market power of a 
bank allows it to reduce costs through economies of scale and gain monopoly 
rents. Thirdly, we investigate the role of institutional development by regressing 
banking efficiency on indictors of banking reforms, enterprise restructuring, and 
privatization. Our findings support the positive impact of institutional reforms. In 
particular, liberalization and relaxation of regulation of the banking sectors allow 
banks to gain economies of scope and scale. Privatization and improved corporate 
governance of enterprises also enhance efficiency of banking sectors. 
  We believe that a better understanding of the factors that influence the 
performance of SEE banking sectors is of major interest both to researchers and 
policy makers for a number of reasons. Firstly, though political conflicts delayed 
the transition process of SEE countries, with the economic and political 
stabilization of this region, significant and fast growth has taken place in recent 
years (Backe and Walko, 2008). The functioning of a competitive and efficient 
banking system is also crucial to reduce the gap between this economically 
relatively underdeveloped region and the rest of Europe. It is therefore of timely 
and utmost interest to investigate how well banking sectors perform, and what 
factors shape bank performance in these transition countries. Secondly, the 
momentum of EU accession also highlights the necessity to better understand the 
performance of SEE banks. Bulgaria and Romania joined already the EU in 2007 
and in several other SEE countries negotiations for future accession are under 
way. In others, a beginning in negotiations would require significant prior 
changes. To meet the criteria of EU membership, it is crucial for policy makers to 
know whether their financial sectors can withstand competition under open 
market conditions. Thirdly, despite of similarities with CEE, countries in SEE also 
have idiosyncratic features that set them apart and it is of interest to see whether 
banking development follows a similar pattern than in CEE. Countries in SEE are  
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more heterogeneous than those in CEE, with significant differences in their legacy 
from the socialist system, political events that enfolded after 1989, level of 
economic development and accession status to the EU. Such variations may have 
shaped the performance of the banks in countries of the SEE region differently 
from their CEE counterparts. Therefore, the main objective of our paper is to 
provide an extensive analysis of bank performance in the SEE region. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we start with a 
brief literature overview of banking efficiency research in transition economies, 
and then provide a description of the background and recent development of 
banking industries in SEE countries. In section 3, we present methodology, data, 
and summary statistics. Section 4 reposts the results of efficiency estimation as 
well as regression analysis relating the determinants of cost- and profit efficiency 
of SEE banks. Section 5 gives our conclusions. 
 
 
2  Literature review and background of SEE 
banking sectors 
The literature identifies three major factors that tend to affect banking efficiency 
of transition economies, namely, ownership characteristics, market structure-
competition and institutional reforms. In this section we present a brief overview 
of key findings on these factors. We then follow by a short description of features 
of banking industries in SEE countries. 
 
 
2.1   Brief literature review on transition banking 
Findings of the literature are inconsistent on the relative performance of foreign 
banks in transition countries. Early studies of single country experiences find 
generally  that foreign banks perform better, followed by domestic private and 
state-owned banks (ie Hasan and Marton, 2003 for Hungary; Kraft et al, 2006, 
Jemric and Vujcic, 2002 for Croatia; Weill, 2003 for Czech Republic and Poland; 
Mertens and Urga, 2001 for Ukraine). The higher efficiency of foreign banks is 
also confirmed by a number of cross-country studies (ie Grigorian and Manole, 
2002; Bonin et al, 2005a, b; Fries and Taci, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006). 
The higher efficiency of foreign-owned banks is explained by their superior 
management skills and advanced technology, access to lower costs of funds from 
the parent company, less subject to domestic credit allocation rules, lack of legacy 
costs, such as non-performing loans from former periods, and differences in 
clientele, such as larger share of foreign-owned companies than that of  
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domestically owned companies (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2000; Nikiel and 
Opiela, 2002). Moreover, it is also argued that foreign banks tend to cherry pick 
the most profitable opportunities. 
  In contrast to such findings, there is also significant research evidence that 
does not find significant cost efficiency differences between foreign- and 
domestically owned companies or find that domestically owned companies are 
more efficient (Vander Vennet, 1996; Green et al, 2004; Zajc, 2006; Lensink et al, 
2008; Mamatzakis et al, 2008). These studies tend to emphasize the inadequate 
information of foreign banks about local conditions and markets and the 
difficulties to establish relational networks. Such difficulties tend to result in 
higher costs in new market (Buch, 2003; Berger et al, 2000). Over time, 
improvement in the institutional environment tends to reduce these cultural and 
informational barriers and allows foreign banks to take full advantage of their 
greater expertise compared to domestic banks (Lensink et al, 2008; Haselmann 
and Wachtel, 2010). 
  Evidence from former studies also tend to support the view that performance 
of domestic private banks is less efficient than of foreign banks, and that among 
the three groups government-owned banks are the least efficient. Recent empirical 
evidence, however, identifies efficiency improvement of domestically owned 
banks. For example, Bonin et al (2005b) find that domestic banks, compared to 
foreign banks, enjoy local advantages in pursuing fee-for-service business. 
Analysis at cost efficiency of Bulgarian banks (Nonovsky and Tochkov, 2009) 
shows that the efficiency gap between domestic and foreign banks was reduced 
during the 2005–2007 period. Comparing domestic private- and state-owned 
banks, Kraft et al (2006) find that de novo private and privatized banks are not 
more efficient than state-owned banks. Similarly, Karas et al (2010) research of 
Russian banks does not find significant difference between efficiency of privately- 
and state-owned bank. These studies indicate that the improved performance of 
government-owned banks could be partly explained by their advantage of 
accessing lower rate of deposit because of government support (Karas et al, 2010), 
and partly by improved governance and competitiveness subsequent to their 
restructuring and modernization (Kraft et al, 2006). 
  The two major streams of theories that establish relationship between 
competition and bank performance have predictions that conflict. The quiet life 
hypothesis, on the one hand, argues that when the firm has monopoly power 
managers tend reduce their efforts and grab a share of monopoly rents through 
discretionary expenses (Hick, 1935). Under such assumption market power affects 
negatively both cost- and profit efficiency of banks. The structure-conduct-
performance paradigm, on the other hand, assumes that strong market power 
allows banks to extract monopolistic profits by offering lower deposit rates and 
charging higher loan rates (Bain, 1956). This would predict a positive relationship 
between market power and profit efficiency. Moreover, to monitor borrowers  
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banks rely on their comparative advantage (Diamond, 1984), consequently, strong 
market power allows them to enjoy economies of scale and reduce costs of 
monitoring. Consequently, competitiveness of individual banks leads to higher 
cost efficiency. Empirical evidence on the role of banking competition on 
efficiency in transition economies was inconsistent as well. Yildirm and 
Philippatos (2007), examining CEE banking sectors, find that industry 
competition has positive influence on cost efficiency but is associated negatively 
with profit efficiency. Brissimis et al (2008), however, find that greater 
competition leads to higher profit efficiency. Kosak et al (2009) use the number of 
banks that operated in the country as proxy for competition and find that during 
1996–2006 an increase in the number of banks was associated with higher cost 
efficiency. These papers that look at market competition in terms of industry 
market structure tend to support a positive relationship between market 
competition and bank efficiency. Research also investigates the relationship 
between market power of individual banks and their efficiency. Pruteanu-Podpiera 
ffect of individual banks’ market power 
on their efficiency in the Czech Republic, and find that greater market power of 
firms is associated with higher efficiency. Their findings raises questions about 
policies that seek to promote bank competition so that the price of financial 
services is reduced. Their findings also suggest that greater banking competition 
may hamper banks to gain economies of scale in monitoring. This in turn would 
result in higher loan rates. 
  It is well established that banks behave differently under different institutional 
settings (ie Haselmann and Wachtel, 2010). This is also the case for transition 
economies where during the past two decades policy changes and market reforms 
have contributed to important changes in the institutional framework. In analyzing 
the impact of banking reforms in 15 transition economies during the 1994–2001 
period, Fries and Taci (2005), for example, show that banks’ costs decrease 
during the early stages of regulatory reforms, but over time with the 
implementation of reforms costs increase. Brissimis et al (2008) study of 
transition economies that became EU members find that banking reforms exerted 
a positive impact on profit efficiency. Griogorian and Manola (2002), argue that 
different regulatory measures affect cost efficiencies differently. For example, 
higher minimum capital requirement for banks improved cost efficiency but limits 
on exposure to a single borrower had no significant impact. A negative impact of 
banking regulatory changes on bank cost efficiency is found by Asafteri and 
Kumbhakar (2008) and Tockhov and Nenovsky (2009). Regarding the effect of 
privatization, Bonin et al (2005b) show that both the method and timing of 
privatization matters: early-privatized banks were found to be more efficient than 
those privatized later. Kraft et al (2006) analysis of the Croatian banking sector, 
however, finds that privatization did not improve efficiency immediately. Apart 
from these studies that investigate the impact of institutional variables on 
et al. (2008), for example, examine the e 
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efficiency there is a large body of literature that relates the importance of legal 
environment to financial sector development (ie Pistor et al, 2000; Haselmann and 
Wachtel, 2010; Haselmann et al, 2010). These studies suggest that bank lending in 
transition economies is greatly influenced by insolvency laws, contract 
enforcement, and creditor protection. 
 
 
2.2  Background of SEE banking industries 
Though the countries of SEE are heterogeneous in terms of their legacy and 
political conflicts they experienced, the transition process of their banking sector 
shows commonalities. Political events delayed implementation of major economic 
reforms, and inadequate bank regulation and supervision and accumulation of 
large non-performing loans from state-owned enterprises contributed to financial 
crisis that all the SEE countries experienced in the late 1990s.  Privatization and 
recapitalization of banks were speeded up subsequent to banking crisis. This took 
place with a significant participation of foreign banks and support from the EBRD 
and IMF. By around 2000, most countries completed privatization of their banks 
and several of them initiated accession negotiations with the EU. Under the 
accession agreements respective governments made commitments to align their 
financial sector regulatory and supervisory norms with that of the EU and to open 
up the banking sector to foreign investors. These measures improved significantly 
the investment climate and encouraged foreign banks to participate actively in 
privatization of state-owned banks. Most of the foreign banks are based in 
neighboring European countries, notably in Austria, Italy, Greece, and in some of 
the countries from France and Turkey. Prior to entering SEE markets, most of 
these same foreign banks made major acquisitions in the privatization of CEE 
banks and gained experience in operating in this region. The banking sectors that 
emerged in SEE countries are largely foreign owned, and the share of state-
owned- and domestically- owned private banks is very small. Summary review of 
the role of banks by ownership of assets and changes over the 1999–2008 period 
are presented in Table 1. 
  Transition experience of countries was influenced by their legacy and the 
subsequent political events. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, had more rigid 
and centralized economic system than most other transition countries. At the onset 
of the reforms, during the early 1990s, the government promoted entry of new 
banks through very liberal policies but entry of foreign banks was very restrictive. 
Internal political events delayed privatization banks and their continued lending to 
ailing state-owned enterprises resulted in the accumulation of large non-
performing loans and the subsequent banking crisis. By 2000, the privatization 
process was largely completed in Bulgaria, though this process was slower in  
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Romania. In 2000, Bulgaria and Romania’s negotiation for accession to the EU 
began and under the accession criteria entry restrictions on foreign banks were 
eliminated. By the late 2000s, the share of assets controlled by foreign banks was 
close to 90%. 
  Compared to other SEE countries, the former Yugoslavia, was in favorable 
position at the onset of transition. It had a decentralized economy, mostly under 
worker management, and traded extensively with Western Europe. In the 
successor states of former Yugoslavia, (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) a two-tier banking sector had already been 
functioning since the early 1960s when the former Yugoslavia abandoned the 
Soviet style mono-banking system. This initial advantage had, however, largely 
disappeared with the onset of the Balkan wars in 1991. Following its 
independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991, Macedonia suffered a series of 
economic shocks. In 1992, 85% of the sector’s assets were non-performing. Under 
the early liberal regulatory norms many small private banks were established. 
Subsequent to a banking crisis, in 2000, Macedonia began negotiations with the 
EU and adopted regulation to bring the legislative framework closer to EU 
regulations. Privatization foreign ownership increased rapidly, despite the 
relatively large number of banks the sector became highly concentrated. In 2008, 
the 2 largest foreign-owned banks accounted for almost 2/3
rd of the county’s 
deposits and assets. In Croatia, the government promoted entry of new private 
banks by very liberal policies. However, a large part of the banks were 
undercapitalized and in 1998/99 a banking sector crisis erupted. In 2000, under a 
new government, negotiations of Croatia for EU membership began and reform of 
the banking sector accelerated. In 2001 the share of foreign banks in the sector’s 
assets increased to 84% from 7% in 1998, and in 2008 reached over 90 percent. In 
Serbia, as a result of over a decade of military conflicts as well as political and 
economic isolation of the country, the restructuring of the financial sector started 
later than in other SEE countries. During the Balkan wars the central bank 
confiscated the foreign exchange reserves of the banks that affected adversely the 
liquidity of banks as well as the trust of the population in banks. In 2000, banking 
sector reform stated under a new government and several banks were closed. In 
privatization of state-owned banks the government gave priority to foreign banks 
so that banks can be recapitalized. By 2009, 70% of the sector’s assets were 
foreign owned (EBRD, 2010). Economic reforms in Albania started very slowly 
which had impacted adversely the situation of state-owned banks. In 1997, 90% of 
the assets of the 3 largest state-owned banks were nonperforming. Bailout of the 
financial sector by the government in the late 1990s was very costly and 
underlined the urgency of a rapid privatization and recapitalization through 
participation of foreign banks.  By 2005, the banking sector was fully privatized 
and share of foreign owned assets was 93 percent (EBRD, 2006). 
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3  Methodology and data 
3.1  Estimation of cost- and profit efficiency 
In line with Berger and Mester (1997), we measure cost efficiency by how close a 
bank’s actual cost is to what a best-practice bank’s cost would be to produce the 
same bundle of outputs. Banks that are cost inefficient are either wasting some of 
their inputs (technical inefficiency) or are using the wrong combination of inputs 
to produce outputs (allocative inefficiency), or both (Mester, 2005). Similarly, 
profit efficiency is measured by how close is a bank’s profit to that what the best-
practice bank would produce given the same input conditions. The concept of 
profit efficiency is derived mostly from the revenue side of the banking business, 
although it is also impacted by costs.  For profitability and firm value 
considerations, profit efficiency is a better concept since it also takes the quality 
of the outputs into account (Mester, 2005). 
  Following many recent studies on banking efficiency in transition countries 
(ie Bonin et al, 2005a; Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Karas et al, 2010), our 
paper employs the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) developed by Aigner et al 
(1977) and Meeusen et al (1977). The advantage of SFA is that it can disentangle 
the inefficiency term from the residual. We specify input prices and outputs 
following the intermediation approach.
2 The two input prices are the price of 
borrowed funds (interest expense divided by total borrowed funds) and the price 
of capital per fixed asset (non-interest expense divided by fixed asset), and the 
three outputs are total loans, securities, and other earning assets. We also include 
total equity and nonperforming loans as fixed inputs in the estimation function to 
account for the banks’ endogenous choice of risk (Huges et al, 2001). Using a 
Cobb-Douglas translog functional form, our cost efficiency model is specified as 
follows 
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+ + + + η
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2 The intermediation approach considers banks as mediators that collect deposits and transform to 
loans and other earning assets using labor and fixed capital (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). It has been 
used, for example, by Berger and Mester (1997), Weill (2003), Karas, Schoors, and Weill, 2010.  
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The definition of variables in the cost function is reported in Table 3, µ is the 
inefficiency term and is assumed to have half-normal distribution with positive 
value. The ν represents the random noise which incorporates both measurement 
error and luck. In the estimation, we normalize the equation by one input price 
(w2) to impose linear homogeneity of input prices (Kuenzle, 2005). Since we 
assume a common frontier for multiple countries it is important to control for 
country heterogeneity (Berger and Mester, 1997; Kosak and Zorik, 2010). 
Consequently, we include GDP growth and inflation as proxies for economic 
development and stability, respectively. We also include region dummy to 
account for differences between CEE and SEE states (Grigorian and Manole, 
2002). Kosak and Zorik (2010) find that inclusion of country-specific 
environmental variables in the cost frontier function does not notably change the 
estimated cost efficiency levels. They suggest that this is due to similar transition 
paths environmental conditions in the new EU member states. Therefore, we do 
not include institutional variables in the efficiency estimation, but focus on these 
exogenous variables in the second stage where we try to explain differences in 
efficiency (this approach has been used in Bonin et al, 2005a and Yildirim and 
Philippatos, 2007). Year dummies are included to control for time fixed effect. 
  Our approach to profit efficiency estimation follows the non-standard 
specification.
3 The profit function is similar to the cost function except we replace 
total cost with total profit (PBT) on the left-hand-side of the equation. The error 
term becomes νit – uit because profit inefficiency reduces profit below the frontier 
or best practice level. To avoid taking logarithms of negative profit, consistent 
with the literature, we add a constant amount to all observations that equals to the 
absolute value of the minimum profit (-4383) plus 1. 
  Although the main focus of this paper is the banking sectors of SEE countries 
we include banks of eight major CEE countries in the frontier analysis. This 
allows us to use the higher CEE bank efficiency levels as benchmark for SEE and 
as well as to compare the two groups. We use financial data and income statement 
of banks from BankScope for the period the 1998–2008 period. In editing the data 
we took into account the reported shortcomings of the database (Bonin et al, 
2005a).
4 We allow failures, mergers and de novo entry of banks. To include a 
bank in our sample a bank has to have a minimum of continuous 3 years of data to 
obtain reliable efficiency estimation (Fries and Taci, 2005). The selection process 
                                                 
3 Nonstandard profit function is specified in terms of output quantities and input prices as it 
assumes the possibility of market imperfection and banks therefore have some power to adjust 
output prices and input quantities to maximize profit (Humphrey and Pulley,1997). 
4 We make a careful examination of multiple entries for the same bank because they are not 
completely duplicated observations. First of all, we choose the unconsolidated financial reports of 
commercial banks since this gives the financial data for the bank rather than the holding company. 
Then we check the accounting standards. International Accounting Standards (IAS) data are used 
wherever available; otherwise, inflation-adjusted local accounting standards data are used. All 
bank-level data are inflation adjusted and reported in thousand USD.  
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yields an unbalanced panel with 171 banks (943 observations) in six SEE 
countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Albania), and 209 
banks (1032 observations) in eight CEE countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). Table 2 presents the 
country distribution and means values of key financial variables of banks in each 
country. Table 3 presents the definitions and summary statistics of the input and 
output variables for all banks in our sample. 
 
 
3.2  Measuring bank competition 
Our measure of bank competition is the Lerner index, a well-established indicator 
of competitiveness and market power at individual bank level. This index is 
defined as the markup of the price over marginal cost, divided by the price 
(Lerner, 1934). It captures the power of individual banks to set prices above the 
marginal cost. Higher value of the Lerner index denotes higher market power of 







= . In line 
with previous studies estimating the Lerner index in banking (eg Brissimis et al, 
2008; Koetter et al, 2008; Maudos and de Guevara, 2007), we define the price as 
total revenue (REV) divided by total earning assets (Y), where Y equals the sum 
of loans (y1), securities (y2), and other earning asset (y3). Marginal cost is 
calculated from the estimation of a translog cost function and is specified as 
follows 
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We use stochastic frontier analysis to estimate this equation and obtain the 
coefficients. Marginal cost follows directly the estimation by taking derivatives 
with respect to Y. Since the Lerner index is the markup of the price over marginal 
cost divided by the price it has an upper bound of one when the bank has 
monopoly power and operates with zero marginal cost. It has a value of zero when 
the price is equal to marginal cost and the bank operates in a perfect competition 
market. The Lerner index can also be negative. This happens when the price is 
below marginal cost and the bank is in serious trouble. Table 4 (Column 4) reports 
the Lerner index of SEE banks from 1998 to 2008. 
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3.3 Bank  ownership 
The data for ownership is drawn from BankScope. Since banks of transition 
countries changed ownership several times over the past two decades, it is 
important to have yearly ownership data so that all the ownership changes in our 
sample period are identified (Haas and Van Lelyveld, 2006). A limitation of 
BankScope is, however, that it only provides shareholder information for the year 
when the database was last updated. Therefore, we take separate editions of the 
database (1999, 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007) and fill in the years in between with 
the previous year if data are available. We also go back to 1998 using the same 
ownership as 1999. To achieve higher accuracy we search manually bank 
homepages and business publications as a double check. Through this process we 
identify shareholder information for 145 SEE banks with 689 observations over 
the time period of 1998 to 2008. We group shareholders into three categories: 
foreign, domestic private and government. We then calculate the aggregated 
shares held by each group, and construct three ownership dummy variables for 
each bank in each year according to the type of majority shareholders. In Table 4 
(first three columns), we show the evolution of ownership structure in SEE 
countries. The numbers reported represent the percentage of foreign-, domestic 
private-, and government-owned banks from 1998 to 2008. Consistent with 
progress in the privatization process, our sample shows that the share of foreign 
banks increased dramatically over the years. By the end of 2008, foreign banks 
gained a dominant market share (about 67%). Domestic private and government 
owned banks account for about 29% and 4% of the sample, respectively. 
 
 
3.4  Indicators of institutional development 
Indicators of institutional development are obtained from the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD hereafter) research output. EBRD 
measures banking reform progress in the following three areas: first, creation of a 
two-tier banking sector and interest rate liberalization, second, establishment of 
regulatory norms for prudential regulation and supervision and full liberalization 
of credit and interest rates; and third, significant progress towards the 
implementation of the core principles of Basle Committee. The value of the 
indicator ranges from 1 to 4.3, a higher value denoting better progress. 
  Our institutional variable measuring progress of enterprise restructuring 
captures a country’s adoption of modern corporate governance, tighter credit- and 
subsidy policies vis-à-vis enterprises, the enforcement of bankruptcy legislation, 
actions that foster competition and market discipline, the strengthening of 
financial discipline, and the hardening of budget constraints. The ultimate goal of  
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enterprise restructuring is to foster market-driven restructuring and improve 
corporate control via financial institutions and markets. The EBRD provides an 
indicator of progress in these areas. The indicator has a value ranging from 1 to 
4.3 with a lower value indicating adoption of few reforms to promote corporate 
governance and a higher value meaning significant improvement in corporate 
governance and more effective corporate control exercised through domestic 
financial institutions and markets, fostering market-driven restructuring. 
  Our third measure of institutional development is related to privatization. 
EBRD compiles two indices to measure this progress (large-scale privatization 
and small-scale privatization). The indicator for large-scale privatization ranges 
from 1.0 to 4.3, with 1.0 indicating very limited private ownership while and 
index of 4.3 indicates that more than 75 percent of enterprise assets is in private 
ownership with effective corporate governance and performance close to that of 
advanced industrial economies. The small-scale privatization refers to the 
privatization of small and medium-sized firms. The indicator ranges from 1.0 to 
4.3, a higher value indicating progress in the privatization of small companies. We 
use the mean of the two indicators to obtain the average degree of privatization of 
all enterprises. Table 4 (last three columns) summarizes the pattern of institutional 




4.1  Bank efficiency in SEE countries 
Table 5 presents the estimated cost- and profit efficiency scores of six SEE 
banking sectors from 1998 to 2008 (three years of efficiency scores are 
unavailable for Albania due to insufficient data). As can be seen in Panel A, with 
an efficiency score of 76.95% the Croatian banking sector exhibits the highest 
cost efficiency and. Serbia exhibits a lowest cost efficiency (54.75%) and it 
experienced substantial decline during the period of 2002 to 2005. Bulgaria and 
Romania have an average cost efficiency of 63.39% and 67%, respectively, and in 
both countries cost efficiency increased over time. We find that Albania and 
Macedonia have a relatively high cost efficiency. This suggests that the relatively 
high level of banking sector concentration in these countries allowed banks to 
benefit from economies of scale and production efficiencies. 
  Panel B of Table 5 reports profit efficiency scores. Bulgaria has the highest 
level of profit efficiency, followed by Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, and Serbia. 
Albania had a high level of profit efficiency before 2003. This could be attributed 
to fact that until 2003 still over 70% of bank assets were invested in government 
treasuries that had high interest margin. Croatia has a stable level of profit  
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efficiency, but for Serbia profit efficiency has dropped greatly during the 2006–
2008 period. Romania has the lowest profit efficiency in our estimation. Prior to 
the banking crisis of 1999 the efficiency level was 63% and since than decreased 
in most years. For most countries of the region profit efficiency decreased 
significantly during the global financial crisis of the 2007–2009 period albeit this 
drop varied by countries. 
  In Table 6 cost and profit efficiency scores are presented and compared for 
the SEE and CEE region for the 1995–2008 period. The analysis shows that cost 
efficiency of banks in SEE countries, on average, is 68.59% and significantly 
lower than that of CEE banks, though the average profit efficiency of SEE is not 
significantly different. It is interesting to note that despite the delayed 
restructuring of banking sector in SEE, the cost efficiency scores in the 1995–
2002 period were not significantly different in the two regions. The divergence of 
the trend subsequent to 2001 is, however, interesting: average cost efficiency 
scores declined in SEE countries, and started to increase in CEE. Decrease in cost 
efficiency scores following completion of privatization and major structural 
reforms was also noted in other countries. Increased investments by the new 
owners tend to increase initial costs and thus reduce cost inefficiency. The 
benefits of such restructuring are usually manifest years later, as can be seen in 
the case of positive developments in CEE following 2001.  
 
 
4.2  Regression analysis on the determinants of bank 
efficiency in SEE countries 
4.2.1 Empirical  model 
The second part of our analysis tests the relationship between cost efficiency and 
our set of independent variables. Similarly model is used for establish the 
relationship between profit efficiency and our independent variables. The 
empirical model is specified as follows 
 
it
it 7 t 6 t 5 t 4
it 3 it 2 it 1 0 it
controls ion privatizat e restructur _ enterprise reform _ banking
n competitio dummy _ government dummy _ foreign Eff
μ +
α + α + α + α
+ α + α + α + α =
 
 
The dependent variable ‘Eff’ represents the efficiency of bank i at time t, 
measured by both cost- and profit efficiency. The independent variables include 
bank ownership, competition, and three institutional reforms. Bank ownership is 
captured by two indicators of majority shareholders, namely ‘foreign_dummy’ 
and ‘government_dummy’. When both ‘foreign_dummy’ and  
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‘government_dummy’ are equal to 0, it refers to the benchmark group – domestic 
private banks. The Lerner index is used to proxy bank-level competitiveness or 
market power. Three institutional reforms are ‘banking_reform’, 
‘enterprise_restructure’, and ‘privatization’. We use the indices complied by the 
EBRD to proxy the progress of the reforms. One difficulty in including multiple 
institutional reforms in the same regression is that some of them are highly 
correlated. We therefore use the residuals from regressing each indicator on the 
others as orthogonal measures of these institutional reforms. 
  In the regression we control for the following bank-specific financial 
characteristics. Firstly, we use logarithm of total asset as the proxy for bank size. 
Secondly, since Hughes and Mester (1993) and Mester (1996) demonstrated 
convincingly that, mangers’ risk preference may have important implications on 
efficiency, we control for loan-, capital- and nonperforming loan ratio to capture 
the degree of liquidity, capital, and credit risk, respectively. To avoid a potential 
reverse causality between risk and efficiency, these variables are the lagged levels 
of previous year. Thirdly, following Lensink et al (2008), we also include ROA of 
the previous year as the proxy for previous profitability and managerial efficiency. 
To control for time effect, we include ‘time trend’, calculated as the present year 
less the benchmark year (1997). We also assume that time may have different 
effects under different ownership structures, and therefore include the interaction 
terms between time trend and foreign majority (and government majority). To 
account for the possible effect of financial crisis we include a ‘crisis year 
dummy’, (1 for year 2007 and 2008, 0 otherwise). Country dummies are included 
in the regressions for ownership and competition variables. We do not include 
country dummies in the regression of reforms, since these are measured on the 
country level. Instead, we cluster the standard error by country to control for the 
heterogeneity across countries. Table 7 reports the overall regression results of 
cost efficiency. 
  In exploring the determinants of profit efficiency, we investigate the role of 
ownership, competition and institutional reforms, respectively. Regression results 
are presented in Table 8. 
 
 
4.2.2  The role of bank ownership 
As reported in the Column 1 of Table 7, ‘foreign_dummy’ is associatied 
negatively with cost efficiency. The coefficient is -0.069 at 10% significance 
level, suggesting that in SEE region, foreign banks are marginally less efficient in 
optimizing operating cost than the benchmark group of domestic private banks. 
This finding is contrary to the prior findings on the higher cost efficiency of 
foreign owned banks compared to domestically owned ones (ie Hasan and 
Marton, 2003; Grigorian & Manole, 2002; Fries & Taci, 2005; Berger et al, 2009).  
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An explanation for the relative low cost efficiency of banks may be the result of 
the investment of foreign banks in branch modernization and training subsequent 
to the acquisition of former state-owned banks. In some countries research also 
found that the initial unfamiliarity with the local environment may result for 
foreign banks in higher costs in gathering and processing locally based 
relationship information (Green et al, 2004; Zajc, 2006; Lensink et al, 2008; 
Mamatzakis et al, 2008). Difficulties in breaking into existing relational networks 
tend also increase initial costs of operation (Buch, 2003). These explanations are 
supported by our findings in that we find that the cost efficiency of foreign banks 
tended to increase over time, which is captured by the positive coefficient of the 
interaction term ‘foreign_dummy*time trend’. This suggests that once foreign 
banks undertook early investments and gained more experience with local markets 
their cost efficiency improved. For state-owned banks (‘government-dummy’) we 
do not find a significant relationship to cost efficiency. This suggests that on 
average government-owned and domestic private banks do not perform with 
different cost efficiency. This finding is consistent with some evidence from 
transition economies (Mamatzakis et al, 2008; Karas et al, 2010) that in some 
cases government-owned banks may have advantage of obtaining lower deposit 
rates and thus improving cost efficiency. 
  Reported in Table 8, we find that compared to domestic private banks foreign 
banks are associated with higher profit efficiency, while government-owned banks 
are associated with lower profit efficiency. Both coefficients are statistically 
significant at 1% level and economically meaningful. The higher profit efficiency 
of foreign banks is consistent with the general findings of literature on transition 
banking. Foreign banks offer a wider range of products and services than 
domestic banks and these products generally allow premium pricing. It may also 
be the result of an assumed ‘cherry picking’ practice according to which better 
local banks are privatized or acquired by foreign banks first (Bonin et al, 2005a). 
This phenomenon, however, would be a characteristic of the early years of 
privatization process and be of lesser relevance in later years. Our findings also 
suggest that the profit efficiency of foreign banks declined over the years. This is 
indicated by the negative sign of the interaction term between foreign ownership 
and time trend. Interestingly, the coefficient of ‘government_dummy*time trend’ 
is positive, which means that government banks have started to catch up with 
domestic private banks and they became more profitable in the later years. 
Overall, our results indicate that the gap between foreign-, domestic private-, and 
government owned banks has reduced over time. Consistent with some recent 
studies, this implies that the restructuring and modernization of banking system 
during the first decade of transition improved substantially governance and 




4.2.3  The role of competition 
As shown in the second column of Table 7, competitiveness of individual banks, 
proxied by the Lerner index, has a positive impact on cost efficiency. This 
supports the argument that strong market power allows banks to reap economies 
of scale and reduce costs in monitoring (Pruteanu-Podpiera at al., 2008). The quiet 
life hypothesis is rejected here, as higher competitiveness (or more market power) 
does not lead to higher cost. It is also important to point out that since both cost 
efficiency and the Lerner index are derived from the same production function of 
total operating cost and therefore there is potential endogeneity problem. We 
conduct a Wald test for the exdogeneity of the Lerner index and find that an 
instrumental variable approach is necessary. Following Koetter et al (2008), we 
use lagged level of Lerner index as instrumental variable. Results for the 
instrumental variable approach is reported in Column 3. The predicted Lerner 
index from the lagged level is positively and significantly associated with cost 
efficiency. A comparison with the OLS regression reveals that the magnitude of 
the coefficient almost doubles in the IV estimation in Table 7. This could be 
explained by the assumption that it takes time for the effect of competition on cost 
efficiency to become apparent. Hence, after using lagged level of competition to 
adjust the endogenous relation between the two measures, the magnitude of 
efficiency increases substantially. This result highlights the positive role of bank 
monopoly power in enhancing cost efficiency. In contrast to the quiet life 
hypothesis, our findings suggest that banks exhibiting the largest Lerner margins 
are those that are most cost efficient. We find similar results of competition on 
profit efficiency. In Column 2 of Table 8, we find that individual banks’ 
competitiveness is significantly and positively associated with profit efficiency, 
suggesting that banks with greater market power could enjoy higher profits 
through higher interest margin. In Column 3, we use the instrumental variable 
approach by using lagged Lerner index in order to mitigate the causal relationship 
that higher efficiency produces both higher market power (Demsetz, 1973). The 
magnitude of competition becomes smaller, but remains significant at 1% level. 




4.2.4  The role of institutional variables 
For institutional reforms, we examine banking reforms, enterprise restructure, and 
privatization. As discussed in the model specification, since these three reform 
indices are highly correlated, we first adopt the residual approach to obtain the 
orthogonal measures of these institutional reforms, and then estimate them 
together in the same regression. The results show that all the coefficients of the  
23 
reform indices are positive and statistically significant, which provide strong 
evidence that a better institutional environment can lead to substantial gains in 
cost- and profit efficiency. 
  Elaborating each type of reform in detail, firstly, the positive role of banking 
reform on cost- and profit efficiency highlights the fact that liberalization of 
banking sectors and the subsequent relaxation of regulatory conditions reduce cost 
and enhance returns. It is also consistent with the studies of the CEE banking 
sectors that generally find banking reforms and liberalization exert positive impact 
(ie Brissimis et al, 2008; Fries and Taci, 2005). Secondly, we find enterprise 
restructuring to be positively related with both cost and profit efficiency, meaning 
that banks enjoy lower cost and higher profit when there are sufficient policies to 
promote enterprise restructuring and when there is effective corporate control and 
governance exercised through the markets. We therefore interpret our results as a 
support to the argument that a good corporate government structure helps reduce 
moral hazard problems of the lenders, and therefore it is critically important in the 
development of financial market in transition economies (Stiglitz, 1999; Pistor, 
2000). Thirdly, consistent with Bonin et al (2005b), we find that privatization 
plays a significant role in influencing bank performance. More progress in 
privatization is associated with higher cost- and profit efficiency. The main 
underlying factor for this result is similar to that of enterprise restructuring. 
Specifically, the newly emerged private ownership is likely to promote an 
efficient banking market through enhanced competition and modern governance 
mechanism. Finally, in the last column, we include all the testing variables in one 
equation as a robustness test. Every finding in the prior tests remains robust 
except for the Lerner index. This may suggest that the effect of competition on 





As the second decade of economic transition of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) 
draws to an end, through an arduous process of restructuring, most countries in 
the region have successfully developed privately-owned banking sectors. A 
competitive and efficient banking system is an important step to reduce the gap 
between the relatively underdeveloped SEE region and the rest of Europe. It is 
within this framework that our paper investigates the banking efficiency of SEE 
during the 1998–2008 period. We find that the average profit efficiency of this 
region is close to the CEE region, but average cost efficiency leaves considerable 
room for improvement. Clearly, the beginning of reforms does play an important  
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role. As the case of CEE shows, significant improvement in cost efficiency 
subsequent to restructuring may require a decade or so. 
  The findings of our study which analyzes data including the most recent years 
is quite novel and is different from studies that covered mostly the CEE countries 
and the earlier phases of the transition. For example, we find that foreign owned 
banks are somewhat less cost efficient than domestic private banks. Two factors 
may explain higher cost by foreign banks. First is their initial disadvantage in 
local knowledge in the SEE region. Second, subsequent to their acquisition of 
former state-owned banks, foreign banks invested in the local operations for the 
modernization of the branch, training and often branch expansion. At the same 
time, domestic banks that remained in the market improved their efficiency 
catered mostly to selected narrow niches where they held a comparative 
advantage. Our findings, however, support the general findings of the literature on 
the strong competitive advantage that foreign-owned banks enjoy in their 
operations in less developed markets. This advantage, compared to domestically-
owned counterparts, is evident from the higher profit efficiency of foreign owned 
banks. Since profit efficiency is largely influenced from the revenue side it 
reflects the ability of foreign owned banks to offer a wide range of products and 
services that allows premium pricing. This profit efficiency however tends to 
decline over time, indicating the difficulties of maintaining such early competitive 
advantages. Consistent with this dynamics over the decade and changes in costs 
and profit efficiencies we also find that over time government-owned banks also 
start to catch up with domestic private banks and become more profitable in the 
later years of transition period. 
  Our findings on the positive relationship between the bank’s market power 
and profit efficiency supports the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (Bain, 
1956). What is however interesting in our result is that individual market power is 
also associated positively with higher cost efficiency.  There is some research 
evidence that higher cost efficiency of firms with high market power is explained 
from economies of scale of monitoring (Pruteanu-Podpiera at al., 2008). For 
policy makers in the region this outcome clearly poses decision-making dilemmas 
as to the trade-offs between cost efficiency and profit efficiency. Contrary to the 
somewhat mixed results of the literature, our research on the relationship of 
institutional reforms on bank efficiency identifies a strong and positive 
relationship. It is also evident that progress in the implementation of major 
economic reforms such as enterprise restructuring and privatization are related 
positively associated with banking efficiency. Since firms are major clients of 
banks, performance of the real sector and improvement in corporate governance 
are important prerequisite for a stable and efficient banking sector. The 
completion of the privatization and enterprise restructuring process will certainly 
contribute to higher efficiency of the banking sector.  
25 
  The progress of SEE region to establish a relatively efficient privately owned 
banking system is very impressive and marks a major step towards the integration 
of this region in the European Union. Though understanding the determinants of 
banking efficiency, the focus of our paper, is a critical input for a well-functioning 
financial system, advances in financial sector development would need other 
critical issues that will need future research. This would relate to the persistently 
high costs of lending in this region, the relatively low level of financial 
intermediation, and large differences in access to credit by different company 
types. It will also be important to devote future research to better understand the 
mode of foreign bank entry and past experience in other transition countries, as 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.   Mean scores of cost- and profit efficiency in SEE 
      countries during 1998–2008 
 
Panel A: Cost efficiency  
Year ALBANIA  BULGARIA  CROATIA MACEDONIA    ROMANIA  SERBIA 
1998 /  0.5137 0.7510 0.7781  0.5880 0.7406 
1999 0.5700 0.5143 0.7513 0.7721  0.6305 0.6084 
2000 /  0.5892 0.7687 0.7261  0.6515 0.6188 
2001 0.7607 0.5862 0.7844 0.5818  0.7036 0.6392 
2002 0.7594 0.6124 0.7994 0.7729  0.6879 0.5657 
2003 0.8158 0.6171 0.7932 0.7823  0.6601 0.4757 
2004 0.7796 0.6450 0.7601 0.7511  0.7283 0.4727 
2005 0.7939 0.7000 0.7729 0.7695  0.6728 0.4405 
2006 0.7789 0.7186 0.7670 0.7574  0.6445 0.5223 
2007 0.7222 0.7112 0.7519 0.7412  0.6454 0.5968 
2008 /  0.7277 0.7417 0.6787  0.7429 0.6945 
Overall  0.7615 0.6339 0.7695 0.7374  0.6700 0.5475 
Panel B: Profit efficiency 
Year ALBANIA  BULGARIA  CROATIA MACEDONIA    ROMANIA  SERBIA 
1998 /  0.5621 0.5142 0.5659  0.6297 0.5604 
1999 0.7465 0.6544 0.4990 0.5408  0.5062 0.6608 
2000 /  0.6129 0.5323 0.6383  0.4735 0.5943 
2001 0.6591 0.6387 0.5425 0.6759  0.4303 0.5199 
2002 0.6496 0.6470 0.5412 0.4930  0.4599 0.5724 
2003 0.5283 0.6496 0.5094 0.5749  0.4498 0.6009 
2004 0.5595 0.6312 0.5260 0.6603  0.4296 0.5603 
2005 0.5094 0.6097 0.5077 0.6016  0.4048 0.5714 
2006 0.6530 0.5941 0.5077 0.6974  0.4443 0.4483 
2007 0.5491 0.6475 0.4513 0.6229  0.4672 0.3998 
2008 /  0.5928 0.5035 0.6113  0.3333 0.3854 
Overall  0.5852 0.6236 0.5130 0.6132  0.4576 0.5043 
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Table 6.   Cost- and profit efficiency comparison of SEE and 
      CEE during 1998–2008 
 
   Cost Efficiency Profit  Efficiency 
Year SEE  CEE  Diff SEE  CEE  Diff 
1998 0.6723  0.7118  -0.0395  0.5521  0.5106  0.0415 
1999 0.6609  0.7190  -0.0581**  0.5576  0.4924  0.0652* 
2000 0.6854  0.7115  -0.0261  0.5492  0.5097  0.0395 
2001 0.6885  0.7139  -0.0254  0.5537  0.5116  0.0421 
2002 0.7088  0.6907  0.0181  0.5541  0.5142  0.0399 
2003 0.6875  0.6926  -0.0051  0.5505  0.5182  0.0323 
2004 0.6837  0.7131  -0.0294  0.5484  0.5285  0.0199 
2005 0.6739  0.7097  -0.0358*  0.5359  0.5464  -0.0105 
2006 0.6806  0.7101  -0.0294  0.5276  0.5601  -0.0325 
2007 0.6908  0.7142  -0.0234  0.4992  0.5625  -0.0634** 
2008 0.7192  0.6910  0.0282  0.4832  0.5411  -0.0579 
Overall 0.6859  0.7077  -0.0218***  0.5387  0.5295  0.0092 
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Table 7.   Determinants of cost efficiency 
 
The dependent variable is cost efficiency. Main testing variables include bank ownership, bank 
competition (Lerner index), and institutional reforms. All model specifications control for time 
trend and bank financial characteristics of previous years. Crisis year dummies represent year 2007 
and 2008. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** 
represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
   Dependent Variable: Cost efficiency 
  
Role of 
Ownership Role  of  Competition 
Role of 
Reforms Combine 
   OLS   OLS   IV   OLS  OLS 
Foreign_dummy -0.0690*        -0.0679* 
 (-1.9406)        (-2.0676) 
Government_dummy -0.0250        -0.0039 
 (-0.3795)        (-0.0662) 
Competition (lerner index)    0.0964**  0.1663**    0.1024 
   (2.5574)  (2.4892)    (1.4888) 
Banking reform (EBRD index)        0.3952**  0.3721** 
       (3.4308)  (3.7230) 
Enterprise restructure (EBRD index)        0.5632**  0.5132*** 
       (3.9724)  (4.6713) 
Privatization (EBRD index)        0.5377***  0.5062*** 
       (4.9451)  (5.1832) 
Time trend   -0.0047*  -0.0029  -0.0108***  -0.0096  -0.0136 
 (-1.6999)  (-1.2285)  (-4.4515)  (-1.9137)  (-1.9714) 
Foreign_dummy*time trend  0.0068**        0.0072 
 (1.9875)        (1.6197) 
Government_dummy*time trend  0.0013        -0.0041 
 (0.1897)        (-0.5495) 
Log total assets  -0.0056  -0.0060  -0.0126***  -0.0110  -0.0123 
 (-1.3173)  (-1.5188)  (-2.9656)  (-1.6594)  (-1.6378) 
Loan ratio of previous year  0.1936***  0.2029***  0.2652***  0.1844**  0.1677** 
 (5.7456)  (6.1691)  (8.0270)  (3.4854)  (3.2565) 
Capital ratio of previous year  -0.0217  -0.0236  -0.2119***  -0.0939  -0.0949 
 (-0.3912)  (-0.4330)  (-3.7722)  (-0.9508)  (-0.9460) 
Nonperforming loan ratio of previous year  -0.3280**  -0.3176**  -0.4717***  -0.2426  -0.2073 
 (-2.4342)  (-2.4512)  (-3.5691)  (-1.8094)  (-1.5887) 
Profitability of previous year  0.0825  -0.2281  -0.8908**  0.0670  -0.1074 
 (0.4134)  (-1.0605)  (-2.5756)  (0.2206)  (-0.3199) 
Crisis year dummy (2007&2008)  0.0206  0.0306**  0.0242  0.0270  0.0307 
 (1.4534)  (2.1481)  (1.5094)  (0.6724)  (0.7245) 
Constant 0.7447***  0.6914***  0.8478***  0.8508***  0.8767*** 
 (11.6566)  (11.9145)  (13.5302)  (10.1188)  (8.3230) 
Observations 595  595  576  595  595 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3095  0.3155  0.1612  0.2182  0.2319 
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Table 8.   Determinants of profit efficiency 
 
The dependent variable is profit efficiency. Main testing variables include bank ownership, bank 
competition (Lerner index), and institutional reforms. All model specifications control for time 
trend and bank financial characteristics of previous years. Crisis year dummies represent year 2007 
and 2008. The heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in brackets. *, **, and *** 
represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
   Dependent Variable: Profit efficiency 
  
Role of 
Ownership Role  of  Competition 
Role of 
Reforms Combine 
   OLS   OLS   IV   OLS  OLS 
Foreign_dummy 0.2238***        0.1338** 
 (4.6714)        (2.7028) 
Government_dummy -0.2651***        -0.2784** 
 (-2.9837)        (-3.4919) 
Competition (lerner index)    0.6770***  0.5457***    0.7111*** 
   (15.2506)  (7.2834)    (7.1099) 
Banking reform (EBRD index)        0.2432**  0.1052* 
       (3.0683)  (2.2191) 
Enterprise restructure (EBRD index)        0.4468**  0.2633** 
       (3.5265)  (2.9410) 
Privatization (EBRD index)        0.3437**  0.2270*** 
       (2.9736)  (4.4183) 
Time trend   0.0034 
-
0.0100*** -0.0066**  0.0001  -0.0025 
 (0.8915)  (-3.5890)  (-2.4314)  (0.0271)  (-0.4714) 
Foreign_dummy*time trend  -0.0210***        -0.0131* 
 (-4.5377)        (-2.1669) 
Government_dummy*time trend  0.0254***        0.0255** 
 (2.7817)        (3.1606) 
Log total assets  0.0048  -0.0042  -0.0097**  -0.0067  -0.0079 
 (0.8313)  (-0.9080)  (-2.0357)  (-1.0339)  (-1.3549) 
Loan ratio of previous year  -0.0208  -0.0353  -0.0420  -0.0684  -0.0635 
 (-0.4594)  (-0.9123)  (-1.1334)  (-1.4581)  (-1.0346) 
Capital ratio of previous year  0.0357  0.0062  -0.0480  -0.0044  -0.0341 
 (0.4789)  (0.0970)  (-0.7610)  (-0.0588)  (-0.3659) 
Nonperforming loan ratio of previous year  -0.2511  -0.3171**  -0.1660  -0.1806  -0.0900 
 (-1.3838)  (-2.0773)  (-1.1199)  (-1.1188)  (-0.8752) 
Profitability of previous year  1.9509***  0.5665**  0.7982**  2.6005***  0.5077 
 (7.2552)  (2.2353)  (2.0572)  (4.3211)  (0.9335) 
Crisis year dummy (2007&2008)  -0.0175  0.0132  0.0099  -0.0363  0.0145 
 (-0.9150)  (0.7871)  (0.5474)  (-1.3644)  (0.5714) 
Constant 0.4181***  0.4359***  0.5310***  0.6108***  0.4043** 
 (4.8593)  (6.3766)  (7.5550)  (6.2993)  (3.7313) 
Observations 595  595  576  595  595 
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Variable Name  Definition  Data 
Source 
ROA  Net income divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Interest margin  Interest income minus interest expense, divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Loan to asset ratio  Net loans divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Deposit to asset ratio  Total deposits divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Expense to assets 
ratio 
Total operating expense divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Equity to asset ratio 
(capital ratio) 
Total equity divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Nonperforming loan 
ratio 
Non-performing loan divided by total asset  Bankscope 
Lerner index  Degree of market power or competitiveness of a bank  Bankscope 
Foreign dummy   =1 if more than 50% ownership is foreign  Bankscope 
Government dummy   =1 if more than 50% ownership is government owned  Bankscope 
Banking reform   The extent of bank reforms. The values increase from 1.0 to 4.3, 
with 1.0 indicating a rigid centralized economy and 4.3 implying 




The extent of enterprise restructuring and corporate governance 
development. The values increase from 1.0 to 4.3, with higher 
value implying higher level of progress. 
EBRD  
Privatization  The extent of privatization of state-owned firms. The values 
increase from 1.0 to 4.3, with higher value implying more 
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